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Abstract 
The provincial government of Alberta in Canada experiences significant annual revenue 
variability arising from changes in crude oil and natural gas prices.  This research 
evaluated whether Alberta’s non-renewable revenue risk could be managed using a 
derivatives hedging program.  Results from a historical hedging simulation approach 
suggested that such a program would not have been the most effective method of 
managing revenue risk over the period of 1995-96 to 2003-04.   Total impacts of hedging 
would have varied from Can-$8 Billion to Can $6 Billion over this time period.  These 
results suggest the Alberta government explore alternative methods to manage non-
renewable resource revenue risk. 
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Introduction 
Canadian provincial government  revenue and expenditure are subject to changing 
economic conditions creating uncertainty around provincial budget forecasts.  A 
substantial source of revenue variability for many Canadian provincial governments may 
be derived from the equalization payment portion of federal government transfers made 
to provinces (Snoddon 2004, Boadway and Hayashi 2004, Smart 2004, Boothe 2002).  
However, unlike the majority of provincial governments, Alberta does not receive 
equalization payments and instead relies heavily on revenues derived from non-
renewable natural resources (NNR).  Alberta’ NNR revenue variability and associated 
budgetary risks are primarily due to the variability of oil and natural gas prices. Alberta, 
(Alberta Government 2005) when compared to other countries in 2004, was the second 
largest exporter of natural gas in the world and had crude oil exports comparable to 
OPEC nations such as Libya or Iraq.  
Alberta’s revenue dropped substantially partway through the fiscal year 2001-
2002 when crude oil and natural gas prices were much lower than budget forecasts.  The 
Alberta government cut 1.3 billion (Canadian dollars) from the budget in October 2001 in 
response to this shortfall (Thomson 2002).  Taxpayers, municipal governments and other 
organizations expressed strong concerns to the provincial government over this 
unexpected cut in expenditures.  In response to these concerns, the provincial government 
formed the Alberta Financial Management Commission (AFMC) to investigate 
provincial revenue variability.  The commission was given many tasks, but the Alberta 
finance minister publicly asked this commission to “investigate whether hedging [in 
regards to energy prices] could work for the government as well as it does for farmers” 
(Thomson 2002, p. A.6).  The final report from AFMC (2002) included twenty-five   2 
recommendations.  Recommendation seventeen suggested Alberta research 
“…alternative ways of managing the risks of weather-related costs and energy prices, and 
the use of forward pricing options such as hedging, collars, derivatives and swaps
1
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the feasibility of the Alberta 
government to use derivative based hedging strategies
” 
(p.66) in an overall risk management framework. 
2
 
 to manage budgetary risks 
stemming from the variability of non-renewable resource revenue.  A historical 
simulation model was developed to measure the potential impact of hedging on reducing 
deviations between actual revenue and budget projections.  Specifically, futures 
derivatives strategies were evaluated to provide insights into more sophisticated 
derivative based risk management programs. The analysis provided insights into whether 
the Alberta government should consider hedging NRR or under what conditions such a 
program may be feasible. 
                                                
1 Derivatives are contracts on some underlying asset such as crude oil.  The value of the 
derivative is “derived” from the underlying value of the asset.  Futures contracts can be 
opened at zero cost (ignoring transaction costs) and fix the price of the underlying asset 
in the future for a specified location, with the owner of the futures contract responsible 
for any daily losses or gains in the value of the contract (i.e. margin).  Options give the 
owner the right but not the obligation to buy or sell the underlying asset.  To gain 
ownership of the option the owner must pay an option premium.  Forward contracts are 
similar to futures contracts but the owner is not responsible for any gains or losses in the 
contract value until the date of contract expiry.  Swaps are a portfolio of forward 
contracts with different dates of maturity and with one fixed price.  Collars are a portfolio 
of positions in options that allow prices to vary within a range but fix a lower and upper 
bound on the price variation. 
2 Derivative based hedging is the use of derivative contracts such as futures contracts, 
forward contracts, option contracts or swap contracts to reduce risk.   3 
Non-Renewable Resource Revenue and Derivatives Usage to Manage NNR 
  Kneebone (2002) reported that Alberta government dependence on NNR revenue 
began in 1931.  NNR has contributed to 41% of Alberta’s total revenue within the last 
few years, and as high as 79% during the 1979-80 fiscal year (Figure 1).  When revenue 
falls short of budget expectations, governments may reduce the revenue shortfall through 
methods such as increasing taxes, running deficits (a consistent practice of Alberta from 
1985-94) or stop and go expenditures where planned expenditures are put on hold until 
revenues increase.  Due to the provincial Fiscal Responsibility Act, the Alberta 
government was not allowed to run budget deficits in 2001-02.    This meant that 
Alberta’s ability to offset revenue shortfalls was limited to increasing taxes or decreasing 
planned expenditures.  Tax increases and expenditure cuts are not viewed positively by 
the voting public and may have political costs (Swidler et al. 1999). 
The problem of unstable NNR revenue is not unique to Alberta.  State 
governments in the United States such as Alaska and Texas, and national governments 
such as Mexico have relied on NNR revenue.  Alaska’s, Texas’ and Mexico’s NNR 
revenue has comprised as much as 75% (Lindahl 1996), 10% (Overdahl 1987), and 31% 
(Daniel 2001) respectively of total government revenue. 
Alaska has not participated in derivative based hedging and has instead used a 
stabilization fund to help manage NNR revenue risk.  Both Mexico and Texas have used 
hedging programs to help manage their NNR risks.  Although the specific hedging 
program details of Mexico are not known, Mexico was reported to have successfully used 
derivative markets to stabilize revenue in the early 1990’s (Daniel 2001).   
Swidler et al. (1999) and Lindahl (1996) both evaluated the hypothetical use of 
various derivative based hedging strategies for Texas.  Swidler et al. (1999) found that   4 
derivatives could reduce the chance of severe budget deficits.  Lindahl (1996) found that 
the use of swaps during the 1991 period could have locked in prices of oil 
U.S. $0.85/barrel above the average and that straddled costless collars generated extra 
revenue and protected against further losses during market downturns.  Thus, from these 
studies it can be hypothesized that derivatives may provide potential benefits for Alberta. 
  Derivative based hedging strategies may have financial and political costs.  The 
Alaska Department of Revenue (2002) estimated that the transactions costs of using 
futures contracts could be U.S. $18-20 million with potential margin calls reaching 
U.S. $950 million, and the premium costs of options reaching U.S. $300 million.   
Margin calls are payments made by the owner of the futures contract to the futures 
exchange market on derivatives positions that are losing money.  Swidler et al. (1999) 
found that although hedging could reduce extreme budget deficits for Texas, hedging 
increased the chance of a deficit occurring.  There is also the financial cost of missing out 
on higher revenues as strategies such as swaps and futures may remove the possibility of 
realizing higher revenue during market upturns.  Politically, the loss of potential revenues 
may not be viewed favorably by the public, and politicians may not be rewarded when 
hedging programs are successful (Alaska Department of Revenue 2002). 
Hedging Description 
Prior to outlining the methodology employed, a description of derivative based 
hedging is provided.  An example of a derivative is a futures contract, which is traded on 
a variety of exchanges such as the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).  Futures contracts include specifications on price, 
type of product, quantity and delivery location, and the specific time in the future when 
the product must be delivered.  The specified delivery month (e.g. June 2004 delivery for   5 
crude oil) differentiates one futures contract from another futures contract on the same 
product (e.g. August 2004 delivery for crude oil).  An individual or business may buy or 
sell these contracts by putting up a small fraction of the contracts nominal dollar value 
(i.e. margin).  Thus, these contracts are highly levered financial instruments.  The futures 
contract may be cancelled by entering into the opposite contract position (e.g. buy or sell) 
prior to the contract expiry date.  Delivery of the underlying product specified in the 
contract does not actually have to be completed if the initial futures position is offset 
prior to the delivery date.  Users often pay a transaction fee to enter into derivatives 
contracts. 
  Typically, derivative based hedging refers to establishing a position (i.e. buying or 
selling contracts) in a derivative that is opposite to the position or intended position in the 
cash market.  Essentially, hedging transfers the price risk to another party.  Under ideal 
circumstances, the position in the derivatives contract cushions changes in the cash 
market.  For example, for an oil producer or a farmer selling commodities, the hedge 
position would be set up such that the hedge is making enough money to offset losses in 
commodity sales when prices are dropping.  This has a flip side.  If commodity prices are 
rising for the oil producer or farmer, then the hedge position will be losing money and 
offset gains on commodity sales.  Hedging attempts to lock in a fixed price or price range 
using derivative contracts such as futures and reduce the variability in revenue or cost 
forecasts. 
  Positions are generally taken in futures contract months, matching the time of sale 
or purchase of the underlying assets.   However, the number of future positions needed 
over the year to hedge revenues as large as Alberta’s may comprise the majority of open   6 
positions in that specific derivative market.  This may create liquidity problems, as 
liquidity in the market often declines quickly for derivative contracts that mature at later 
expiry dates.  Thus, it may not be feasible for Alberta to enter into a large number of 
futures positions in distant contract months. 
A rolling hedge strategy was employed in the simulation to overcome liquidity 
problems in distant contract months for crude oil, natural gas, and currency risk facing 
the Alberta government.  This strategy consisted of entering into the total number of 
futures positions needed for the year in the nearest (nearby) contract month.  A portion of 
the futures positions held in the nearby contract were then offset/closed systematically, 
reflecting the actual market transactions of the underlying asset.  Any futures positions 
that were not offset by the current nearby contract’s expiration date were offset just prior 
to the expiration of the contract and immediately re-entered again in the next nearby 
contract month.  This process of transferring open positions from one nearby contract to 
the next was a rolling hedge strategy.  Although the rolling hedge strategy helps to 
overcome liquidity issues it can introduce other financial risks, such as unexpected 
changes in price differences between nearby futures and later contract months (Edwards 
1995). 
  Alberta could enter into a derivatives program to manage NNR revenue using 
public risk markets such as the NYMEX (e.g. crude oil contract and natural gas contracts) 
or private markets such as the over-the-counter markets (OTC).  The startup costs may 
differ depending upon the derivative instrument used however the model results would be 
representative of the long run direct or indirect costs that would have to be absorbed by 
the government of Alberta.   7 
Methodology 
The ability of the Alberta government to use derivative based hedging to offset 
their revenue forecast risks stemming from changing crude oil prices (NYMEX) and 
natural gas prices (NYMEX) was evaluated using a historical simulation. Alberta has 
reported budget sensitivity values since the 1995-96 budget estimating how associated 
revenues will change with changes in average annual crude oil price, gas price, and the 
U.S.$/CAN$ exchange rate.  These sensitivity values are directly comparable to delta 
hedge estimates.  Delta is defined in the hedging literature as an estimate which relates 
the change in portfolio value to the change in price of the underlying asset or derivative.  
Mathematical descriptions of delta can be found in Hull (2002).  Delta is used to estimate 
the number of underlying derivatives positions that should be held to offset changes in 
the portfolio value.  Delta estimates become less accurate and effective when large 
changes in the portfolio’s underlying asset price occur and a new delta should be 
estimated when prices change significantly.  
Alberta’s sensitivity values are reported once per budget period and are estimated 
under the assumption of annual price changes.  The sensitivities can be used to estimate 
hedge positions to offset NNR risk where the same delta is used through out the year.  
The effectiveness of the delta hedge may become less useful overtime as energy prices 
change. 
Using the sensitivity values reported in the budget periods of 1995-96 to 2003-04, 
100% delta hedges were estimated and used to determine the number of futures contract 
positions needed to offset Alberta’s revenue risks stemming from crude oil, natural gas,   8 
and the $U.S./$CAN exchange rate
3
Cash received or paid out from hedge position gains/loses were estimated from 
the simulation.  The difference between the budget forecasts and the actual revenue 
inflow were calculated from Alberta budgets and annual financial reports.  The 
transaction costs of entering and exiting the hedge positions were calculated using the 
number of futures transactions that occurred during the simulation and using a transaction 
cost typically charged by brokerage firms for a low risk high volume client.  The cost or 
revenue on borrowing or investing for the hedge program was calculated using the 3-
month spot U.S. Treasury Bill rate. 
.  The annual budget period started in April and 
ended in March of the following year.  A rolling hedge strategy was used, where the 
entire  upcoming budget year’s worth of estimated futures hedge positions were entered 
into on the last Friday of March using the nearby futures contract month.  The weekly 
portion of the total futures hedge (1/52) matching the expected NNR revenue for the 
week was then offset on the Friday or last open trading day of each week.  On the last 
Friday prior to the contract closing date, the futures positions still open in the market 
were rolled over to the next nearest futures contract.  
The hedge results were compared to the NNR budget forecast errors (i.e. Actual 
NNR Revenue - Budget NNR Revenue forecasts) using Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) 
and Mean Absolute Error (MAE) measures.  However governments may use price 
forecasts that differ significantly from market based price forecasts.  Overly conservative 
or optimistic price forecasts would bias the NNR revenue forecast error up or down.  
Comparing the simulated hedge results to the budget forecast NNR revenue error may 
                                                
3 Delta hedges were adjusted to match the currency and measurement units used in each   9 
provide misleading conclusions on the benefits of the hedging program.  A swap price 
methodology was employed with budget delta sensitivity estimates to provide an 
alternative market based price estimate and adjust budget NNR revenue forecasts. 
  Swap prices were calculated for oil and gas following the commodity valuation 
formulae in Das (1994).  Essentially, a single swap price for oil or gas for each budget 
year was calculated using prices from the futures contract term structure (i.e. the prices of 
contracts for different contract maturity months) from the NYMEX and an estimate of the 
quantity of crude oil and natural gas production affecting the budget each week.  LIBOR 
interest rates were used in the swap price formula. 
Data 
  Alberta’s revenue projections were obtained from annual budgets for the years of 
1978-79 to 2003-04 (Government of Alberta).  The annual budget documents also 
provided the sensitivity estimates (i.e. delta) for crude oil, natural gas and $U.S. currency 
for 1995-96 to 2003-04.  These are reported in Table 1.  For example, a U.S. $1.00/barrel 
(bbl) decrease in the annual price of crude oil was estimated to decrease NNR revenue 
from crude oil by Can $195 Million (M) in 1995-96.  Similar budget sensitivities are 
reported for natural gas and U.S.-Can currency (Table 1).  The historic pricing data to 
July 2004 for crude oil and natural gas futures and spot prices, $U.S./$CAN exchange 
rates, U.S. T-Bill rate, and LIBOR were from BRIDGE CRB. 
Results 
Alberta’s total revenue is plotted using the three general revenue categories of 
income tax, NNR, and other revenue sources for the years of 1978-79 to 2003-04 in 
Figure 2.  Overall, Alberta’s total revenue steadily increased over the periods of 1978-79 
                                                                                                                                          
futures market.   10 
to 2003-04, however, there have been several sharp increases (e.g. 2000-01) and 
decreases (e.g. 1986-87).  Comparing the three revenue categories, revenue variability 
was primarily due to variability in NNR revenue over the study period. 
The values reported in the column next to the oil sensitivities (Table 1) are the 
number of short (i.e. sell) crude oil futures contract positions required on the NYMEX to 
hedge 100% of Alberta’s estimated oil revenue sensitivity.  This would be the initial 
number of contracts required by Alberta on April 1, the beginning of the fiscal year.  The 
number of crude oil contracts opened
4
Alberta’s revenue sensitivity to natural gas peaked at Can $209 M for a 
Can $0.10/Mcf
 at the beginning of the 1996-97 budget year would 
be 146,345.  The number of futures contract positions for that fiscal year would decline 
until reaching zero in the last week of March.  A NYMEX crude oil contract is on 1000 
barrels (bbls) of crude oil. 
5
                                                
4 The number of crude oil futures contracts is calculated as follows.  
 change in the fiscal year average price of natural gas in 1998-99  (Table 
1).  The values reported in the next column are the estimated number of short contracts in 
NYMEX natural gas (Henry Hub) futures contracts to provide a 100% hedge. 










y Sensitivit   $
  = .  From Table 1 for 
1996-97 the initial hedge position is calculated as -199,000,000 $Can *0.7354 
$U.S./$Can * contract/1000 bbls = 146,345 contracts. 
5 MCF  (thousand cubic feet) reported in budget have been adjusted as appropriate for the 
NYMEX natural gas unit of measure used  which is 10,000 million British thermal units 
(MMBTU) per futures contract.  The conversion used was 1 MMBTU=1.036 MCF. 
There are a number of slightly different conversions reported.  The number of hedge 
futures contracts was calculated similar to the crude oil calculation. The Alberta 
Government sensitivities are based on changes in the Alberta Reference price of gas, 
which is essentially a weighted average of the price paid by Alberta consumers’ and an 
ex-border price, reduced by allowances for transporting and marking the gas.   11 
The final sensitivity values used were revenue changes with a U.S.$0.01/Can$ 
change in the fiscal year average currency rate (Table 1).  Commodity prices in Alberta 
are sensitive to international prices and changes in the value of the U.S. currency will 
change commodity prices in Alberta.  Alberta budgets reports this sensitivity as the price 
of Canadian dollars in U.S. currency.  The numbers of Canadian dollar futures contracts 
required for a 100% hedge are reported in the final column of Table 1.  It would not be 
feasible to trade this many contracts (e.g. 84,925 contracts in 2003-04) on the CME due 
to liquidity constraints. However, the hedge results and transactions costs from the CME 
would be highly representative of the costs of using the more liquid OTC currency 
markets. 
Historical Hedging Simulation 
The hedge positions from Table 1 and historical weekly futures price data from 
March 1995 to March 2004 were used to simulate a hedging program in crude oil, natural 
gas and $U.S.-$Can currency.  Hedge results such as transactions costs and cost of using 
a rollover strategy were generated by the historical simulation.  For example the 
transactions costs, cost of buying and selling contracts and the cost of borrowing to 
maintain the contracts, ranged from 0.16% (Can-$25M) to slightly over 1% (Can-$213M) 
of annual provincial expenses
6
The mean benefit of crude oil hedging was Can $367 M from 1995-96 to 2003-04 
and crude oil hedge net profits, including transactions costs, varied from Can $1,005 M to 
-$1,488 M (Table 2).  Natural gas hedges had a much wider range of results with the 
.  However, the focus of the discussion below is on the 
overall hedge results and whether hedging reduced budget revenue forecast risk.   12 
impact on revenue ranging from Can $5,736 M to -$6,407 M.  The objective of hedging 
for Alberta would be to reduce errors in budget forecasts.  Table 2 shows the actual 
budget forecast error and the forecast error when the net crude oil, natural gas and 
currency hedge results are included.  For example, hedging crude oil, natural gas and 
currency would have provided a positive revenue boost in the 2001-02 fiscal year and 
changed the forecast error from -$747 M to $5,360 M.  
A hedging program in fiscal years other than 2001-02 may have had significant 
negative revenue impacts.  A hedging program in 2000-01 would have changed a positive 
budget forecast error of Can $6.5 Billion (B) to a negative budget forecast error of 
-$1.6 B.  The forecast error was lower with hedging but the hedge program by itself 
would have reduced provincial revenues by over Can 8 B.  Politically, it might be 
difficult to justify to the public a risk program that had missed out on revenues worth 
approximately 30% of projected provincial expenses. 
The main purpose of implementing the hedges as a risk management strategy is to 
reduce the variability of the Alberta government’s revenue.  In the hedging literature, a 
successful farm revenue hedging program should reduce the forecast error between 
projected revenue and actual revenue.  The difference between the actual revenue and the 
budget forecasts provides a measure of errors.  Two measures of forecast error, Root 
Mean Square Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error (MAE) are presented in Table 3.  
Formulae for RMSE and MAE are commonly found in the literature and versions of the 
                                                                                                                                          
6 The transaction costs in 2001-02 would have added net $Can 42 M due to interest on 
the cash inflow from the hedges during the fiscal year. This value excludes the profits or 
losses from the ownership of the futures contracts.   13 
formulae are defined in Table 3.  These risk measures need to be interpreted with caution 
due to the low number of error estimates available. 
The first four rows in Table 3 provide a comparison between the error measures 
without hedging and the errors with hedging based upon the actual budget forecasts and 
the hedge results.  Hedging reduced the RMSE in all cases for the NNR revenue error for 
crude oil, natural gas and for the entire budget.  Since there was no separate revenue 
category reported for currency, it was not feasible to estimate a RMSE for the currency 
hedge.  The results for the MAE were similar for the total budget error however natural 
gas hedging increased the MAE slightly.  In aggregate these results suggest that a full 
hedge program would lead to a slight reduction in budget revenue forecast errors.  
Hedging would have reduced the budget revenue risk. 
Governments may expressly or inadvertently bias revenue projections up or down 
by using overly conservative or optimistic NNR price forecasts.  The mean budget 
forecast error without hedging in Table 2 was $2.3 B and the annual errors showed that 
actual revenues exceeded forecast revenues in eight years out of nine.  Alberta may have 
been overly conservative in their NNR price forecasts during the period of this hedging 
study.  Analyzing a hedge program with a biased revenue forecast may lead to incorrect 
conclusions about the benefits of the program. 
An alternative budget revenue forecast at the beginning of the budget year was 
developed using the futures prices from the NYMEX for crude oil and natural gas to 
estimate a swap price for each commodity.  This swap price represented an alternative 
market based average price forecast for the budget year (Figure 3).  Comparisons of the 
estimated swap prices to the budget prices (Figure 3) are suggestive of conservative   14 
budget price forecasts over the latter part of the simulation period.  The difference 
between the market based swap price and the price forecast reported in Alberta’s budget 
were combined with the budget sensitivities in Table 1 to adjust the budget NNR revenue 
up or down.  
The RMSE and the MAE were calculated using the swap revised budget forecasts 
and are reported in the last four rows in Table 3.  Forecast error was lower for both 
RMSE and MAE measures of swap revised budget forecast errors versus the errors using 
Alberta’s budget forecasts.  This suggests the swap prices provided a better forecast of 
crude oil and natural gas prices than the estimates used in the budgets.  Hedging 
combined with swap price adjusted budget forecasts generally resulted in higher RMSE 
and MAE than if no hedging had been implemented.  The only exception to this increase 
in risk was the MAE on natural gas.  Generally hedging would not reduce provincial 
revenue risk if improved market based price forecasts were used in the budget.  
Implications and Conclusions 
Historically, the Alberta government has experienced both positive and negative 
revenue shocks, primarily due to variability in non-renewable resource revenues.  These 
revenue shocks have at times contributed to budget deficits, forced planned expenditures 
to be postponed, and have also generated large surpluses.  With a large portion of the 
province’s revenues attributable to non-renewable resource revenues (Figure 1), the 
provincially legislated inability to run deficits (Fiscal Responsibility Act) and potential 
political costs of cutting planned expenditures, there are incentives for Alberta to manage 
the variability of NNR revenues.  The feasibility of a derivatives hedging program for 
NNR revenue, a recommendation from the 2002 Alberta Financial Management 
Commission, was evaluated.   15 
Over the study period of 1995-96 to 2003-04, a derivative based risk strategy 
appeared unfavorable.  Actual budget revenue forecast errors may have been reduced but 
when the budget NNR forecasts were adjusted using readily available market 
information, hedging using futures contracts may have increased revenue risk.  These 
results may be due in part to the specific time period of the analysis, as oil and gas prices 
followed an upward trend, generating positive revenue shocks and numerous realized 
surpluses.  This result could also be partially due to the inability of the hedge model to re-
estimate budget sensitivities (i.e. hedge deltas) during the fiscal year.  Considering the 
above factors, as well as the transactions costs of the strategies (e.g. occasionally 
exceeding 1% of provincial expenditures), a derivative based hedging strategies may 
have generated political criticism if implemented. 
However, considering the performance of the strategies strictly from a risk 
management perspective, the strategies did perform well in one aspect.  The strategies 
would have prevented the negative shock that was incurred by the province in 2001-02.  
Rolling hedge strategies would have generated up to Can $ 6 B in additional revenues in 
2001-02 when the government was forced to cut Can $1.3 B from spending.  However if 
the risk management program had been started the previous year of 2000-01, the hedge 
strategy program would have reduced provincial revenues by over Can $8 B leading to a 
net budget forecast error of Can-$1.6 B.  It is unlikely that a risk management program 
that had a Can -$8 B impact in 2000-01, equal to about 30% of provincial expenditures, 
would have survived to be implemented in 2001-02. 
Limitations of this research include the fact that it was accomplished under a set 
of assumptions, such as assuming adequate liquidity in the futures markets.  Also, this   16 
research used published Alberta government sensitivities, which were annual numbers.  
Further research could study if adequate liquidity exists in derivatives markets and 
whether improved sensitivity estimates would change the overall conclusions. Alternative 
derivative instruments such as options could be evaluated however since these 
instruments would also be based on the same NNR revenue sources, the results are 
suggestive of the costs Alberta directly or indirectly would have to pay to use alternative 
derivatives. 
The recommendation from the AFMC was to explore comprehensive risk 
management programs employing a variety of risk tools and adjusting the risk program 
for interactions between different risks.  This type of program is currently beyond the 
ability of the Alberta budget model to manage.  Budget price sensitivities are updated 
infrequently if at all during the budget year.  Budget NNR price forecasts may be 
consistently biased as suggested by the decrease in NNR revenue forecast error when 
market estimated swap prices were used to adjust budget revenue forecasts.  
Comprehensive risk management would require more sophisticated models of revenue 
and expenditure sensitivities.  Such a model might assist in guiding a risk management 
program using public risk markets and OTC markets.  However this model would require 
significant testing and the usefulness of such a model would be limited if biased forecasts 
were continually used for major sources of revenue or expenditure risk.  The results from 
this study suggest that alternative ways to manage NNR revenue risk in Alberta be 
explored and that a derivatives based risk program may not reduce revenue risk.  Alberta 
may not be able to hedge NNR revenue in the same way as farmers hedge their 
commodity risk.   17 
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Table 1: Alberta Budget Sensitivities (Deltas) to Price Changes in Crude Oil, 
Natural Gas and U.S.-Canada Currency and Associated Number of Futures 

























































96  -195,000,000  139,308  -130,000,000  134,729  -60,000,000  42,864 
1996-
97  -199,000,000  146,345  -134,000,000  138,874  -61,000,000  44,859 
1997-
98  -190,000,000  137,712  -134,000,000  138,874  -45,000,000  32,616 
1998-
99  -152,000,000  107,236  -209,000,000  216,603  -37,000,000  26,104 
1999-
00  -135,000,000  90,113  -167,000,000  173,075  -63,000,000  42,053 
2000-
01  -150,000,000  103,440  -154,000,000  159,602  -82,000,000  56,547 
2001-
02  -153,000,000  97,079  -142,000,000  147,166  -120,000,000  76,140 
2002-
03  -108,000,000  67,716  -163,000,000  168,929  -132,000,000  82,764 
2003-
04  -76,000,000  51,634  -106,000,000  109,856  -125,000,000  84,925 
1. These are Alberta sensitivities as reported in annual budgets.  For example a $U.S. 
1.00/bbl drop in average crude oil price during the budget year 1995-96 is estimated to 
decrease Alberta NNR revenue by Can-$195 Million.  
2. The NYMEX crude oil futures is 1000 bbls/contract.  The NYMEX natural gas futures 
is 1 MMBTU/contract which is approximately 1000 MCF (MCF=1000 cubic feet).  The 
CME Canadian dollar futures is $100,000 Can./contract.   20 





($ 1000 Can) 
Natural  Gas 
Hedge Profit 
or Loss 











($ 1000 Can) 
Error: All 
Hedge 






($ 1000 Can) 
1995-96  -248,775  -242,483  124,866  998,000  631,608 
1996-97  -1,471,739  -332,157  -20,678  3,062,000  1,237,426 
1997-98  449,034  -950,932  -75,981  765,000  187,121 
1998-99  1,005,140  2,226,802  -161,340  256,000  3,326,601 
1999-00  -989,995  -356,314  71,460  3,335,000  2,060,152 
2000-01  -1,488,370  -6,406,986  -237,290  6,522,000  -1,610,646 
2001-02  303,358  5,735,597  67,986  -747,000  5,359,941 
2002-03  -488,840  -1,462,945  255,746  2,813,000  1,116,960 
2003-04  -374,660  367,117  725,195  3,959,000  4,676,653 
mean  -367,205  -158,033  83,329  2,329,222  1,887,313 
1. This is the Total Revenue - Budget forecast of Total Revenue. 
2. The profits from hedging crude oil, natural gas and currency are added to the Error 
column to evaluate improvements in actual revenue versus budget projections.   21 
 
Table 3:  Alberta RSME
1 and MAE Measures of Budget Forecast Errors for Crude 






($ 1000 Can) 
Natural  Gas 
Revenue  and 
Budget Forecasts 
Error 
($ 1000)  
Total Budget 
Forecast Error 
($ 1000 Can) 
RMSE from  
Actual - Budget   703,574  2,153,657  3,332,154 
RMSE from 
Hedging + 
Actual - Budget  495,480  2,029,550  2,994,109 
MAE from  




3  382,991  1,432,424  2,245,234 
RMSE from  
Actual – Swap Price 
Adjusted Budget   417,636  1,739,978  2,384,961 
RMSE from 
Hedging +Actual – 
Swap Price Adjusted 
Budget  629,538  1,596,806  2,463,281 
MAE from  
Actual – Swap Price 
Adjusted Budget  337,549  1,088,122  1,754,849 
MAE from Hedging 
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RMSE  .  
2.  The crude oil column includes only the revenue and budget forecasts from crude oil.  
Hedging is from the crude oil hedges only. The natural gas column includes only natural 
gas related calculations.  Total budget column includes all revenue and all hedging (i.e. 
crude oil, natural gas and currency) as calculated from the last two columns in Table 2. 
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Figure 1  Percent of Alberta's Total Revenue Derived from Non-renewable 
Resource Revenue, Income Tax Revenue (Personal and Corporate) and Other from 


















































































































Other Revenue Sources 
Income Tax Revenue (Personal and Corp.)
Non-Renewable Resource Revenue
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Figure 2 - Alberta Income Tax, Non-Renewable Resource, and Other Sources of 




















































































































Other Revenue Sources 
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Figure 3 – Comparison of Estimated Swap Price to Alberta Budget Price Forecasts 
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